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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintitf-Appellee, : Case- Mo yi)U 1 4 I CA 
v* : 
RAYMOND J. VIGIL, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant• : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of burglary, a second 
degree fe] on^ • m< lei \ It .ah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990 ,, and a 
finding that defendant was a habitual criminal under Utah """ode 
Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1990). 
This Court has jurisd.p tion to hear uhe appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
properly denied defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence 
of the burglary seized 1Iom the trunk ol the ai in whinh he was 
riding when stopped and arrested by the police. 
The factual findings underlying the trial court's 
ruling on the moti on t o suppieair w i l l no* bn 'J is tin bed ^p appeal 
unless they : *r clearly erroneous; however, in assessing the 
il conclusions based on its factual findings , 
the appellate court applies a "correction of error" hiandla ui at 
review. State v. Johnson, 111 P, 2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), cert, granted, P.2d (1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional or statutory 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Raymond J. Vigil, was charged with burglary, 
a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), 
and with being a habitual criminal under Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-
1001 (1990) (R. 15-18). 
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as 
charged (R. 151, 153). The trial court sentenced defendant to 
the Utah State Prison for a term of five years to life (R. 214-
15). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts are not in dispute. The following 
summary of the facts is derived from the stipulation of facts 
presented by the parties at the hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress and the evidence presented at trial. 
At approximately 1:00 p.m. on January 14, 1989, Sally 
Salazar lent her red 1975 Monte Carlo to her 16 year-old son, 
Fernando. He was to drive his sister to their grandmother's 
house, about five blocks away, and return home immediately. 
However, after dropping off his sister, Fernando went to the home 
of defendant, his uncle, where he picked up defcmdant and a third 
person. The three then drove to Bountiful, Utah (T. 160-61, 263, 
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265) 1. 
At approximately 2:00 pi m. the same afternoon, Wilma 
Caldwell and her son left Lliel J dome in Bountiful to run some 
errands, * - . * 4: *" j. m. , neighbors discovered that the home 
had been t,. ea emu called the police. Among the items 
reported missing were a television, two V1 R H 1 t,»dt.( > J clothing, 
and some jewelry (SH. 13, T 28-29, 36-37, 56, 6 3 ) . 
A I - County deputy sheriff was on patrol near the 
Caldwell home a: approximately 3:00 p.m. that afternoon when a 
red 1975 Chevrolet Monte Carlo caught his attention. He noticed 
i.hai the Ihren occupants ol the car were Hispanic males who, by 
the way they were dressed, appeared to be from California. The 
deputy, who *-as r,- t aware tha - burglary had been committed in 
the -. ~-> •*-->. * * -:.-T,irce before stopping.it for 
travel ing 4 5 m. p, r a 3 . m .y.-.*. zone (SH. J J - i 4 , 18 ) . 
Defendant was the front passenger in the vehicle. The 
car was registered tc tl le teei iag- B c:ii:l v er' s mother, Sally Salazar. 
The deputy observed that all three occupants had been consuming 
alcohol ^n t j i e c a r ,£r| violation of the open container Jaw Based 
upon this vl ol atiuri, the speedi ng violation,, - ^m with the 
teenager's driver's license, and the absence wt the registered 
owner of the car, the deputy arrested all the occupants and 
impounded the car (SH * 1 4 , T , 7 f. , 1 4 (,»• -49). 
Later that evening, the deputy spoke with Sally Salazar 
ai id recei ved permission to search her car, which had been 
M T > „ r e f e r s t o the trial transcript; "SH." refers to the 
suppression hearing transcript. 
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impounded upon the arrest of her son and his companions. Ms. 
Salazar had not given defendant permission to use or be in her 
car. In a warrantless search of the car's trunk and interior, 
the deputy and two other officers recovered a television, two 
VCR's, a bag of clothing, and jewelry, all of which matched the 
descriptions of items reported missing from the Caldwell 
residence (SH. 3-11, T. 198-99, 205). 
Based on these facts, the trial court ruled, inter 
alia, that the evidence of the burglary seized from the car was 
admissible because it was obtained by the police pursuant to Ms. 
Salazar's voluntary consent to the search of her car (T. 38-39). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal, defendant challenges only the admissibility 
of the evidence seized from the car pursuant to Ms. Salazar's 
consent. The trial court correctly ruled that that evidence was 
admissible because it had been seized by the police pursuant to 
Ms. Salazar's voluntary consent to the search of her car. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
EVIDENCE OF THE BURGLARY SEIZED FROM THE CAR 
WAS ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN SEIZED BY 
THE POLICE PURSUANT TO MS. SALAZAR'S 
VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO THE SEARCH OF HER CAR. 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court should 
have suppressed the evidence of the burglary recovered in a 
warrantless search of Ms. Salazar's car because (1) the initial 
stop of the vehicle was pretextual, (2) the arrests of defendant 
and his companions were a pretext for impoundment of the vehicle, 
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and (3) Ms. Salazar's consent to search the vehicle was not 
voluntarily given. The lower court ruled against defendant on 
each of these points (T. 35-40). Although defendant's pretext 
arguments may find support in several recent decisions of this 
Court, the ultimate issue of whether the evidence seized from the 
car was admissible can be resolved against defendant on the 
ground that the evidence was seized by the police pursuant to Ms. 
Salazar's voluntary consent to the search of her car. 
Under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle 
for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at least a 
reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has 
violated or is about to violate the law (i.e., a traffic or 
equipment regulation, or any applicable criminal law). Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 663 (1979); State v. Gibson, 665 
P.2d 1302, 1204 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State 
v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). A stop of a 
vehicle is, of course, also justified when the officer has 
probable cause to believe that either the vehicle or an occupant 
has violated the law. Ibid. 
Defendant does not claim that the Delaware v. Prouse 
standard was not met when the officer stopped the vehicle in 
which he was a passenger for speeding. Rather, he claims that 
the stop was an unconstitutional pretext stop, which "occurs when 
the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to 
search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an 
unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable 
suspicion to support the stop." United States v. Guzman, 864 
F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988). 
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In State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
disavowed on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 
13, 17 (Utah June 28, 1990), this Court set forth the following 
standard for determining whether an unconstitutional pretext stop 
has occurred: 
[I]f a hypothetical reasonable police officer 
would not have stopped the driver for the 
cited traffic offense, and the surrounding 
circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext, 
the stop is unconstitutional. 
2 
754 P.2d at 979. The inquiry focuses on whether the reasonable 
officer would have made a stop under the circumstances, not 
whether the officer could have made a stop. Id. at 978. The 
test is an objective one. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; Guzman, 
Insofar as Sierra suggests that the Prouse reasonable suspicion 
test and the pretextual stop test are components of a single test 
upon which to evaluate the validity of the vehicle stop, it is 
incorrect. The Prouse standard and the pretext stop standard are 
two distinct standards to be independently applied. The former 
provides the basis upon which to evaluate the reasonableness of 
the initial seizure of the vehicle (which is usually for a 
misdemeanor traffic violation), while the latter is relevant to 
only the evidence of another crime (usually more serious than the 
traffic violation) discovered pursuant to the vehicle stop. This 
is made clear in Guzman, where the Tenth Circuit treated the 
government's objection to the court's adoption of a Sierra-type 
pretextual stop standard as follows: 
Contrary to the Government's argument, 
our approach will not "severely" curtail "the 
ability of the New Mexico Police . . . to 
enforce traffic laws." Brief of the 
Appellant—United States of America at 14. 
No prosecution for violation of a traffic 
regulation will be affected. Police officers 
may always issue appropriate citations to 
drivers who violate traffic regulations. 
Only evidence of a more serious crime 
discovered pursuant to such a stop will be 
excluded if the stop was unconstitutionally 
pretextual. 
864 F.2d at 1518. 
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864 F.2d at 1517. Given the various applications of this 
standard by the Court, compare, e.g., Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-79, 
with State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
rev'd on other grounds, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah June 28, 
1990), and State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), it 
is not clear whether, under the facts of the instant case, the 
officer's stop of the vehicle would be considered a pretext stop. 
Nor is it clear whether the arrests of defendant and his 
companions would, under the facts, be considered a pretext for 
impoundment of the vehicle, such that defendant could challenge 
the subsequent seizure of evidence of the burglary as fruit of 
his unlawful arrest. See Easton v. Hurita, 290 Or. 689, 625 P.2d 
1290, 1295 (1981) (a police officer may arrest and book 
individuals into jail for misdemeanor traffic offenses so long as 
the officer can point to specific, articulable facts justifying 
that action). But, the Court need not address these questions to 
affirm the trial court's suppression ruling. 
Generally, a passenger in a vehicle who has no valid 
property or possessory interest in the vehicle does not have 
standing to raise a fourth amendment challenge to a search of it. 
State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)). However, although some 
courts have read Rakas as barring a passenger in a vehicle from 
challenging the legality of a stop of the vehicle, see, e.g., 
Kayes v. State, 409 So.2d 1075 (Pla. App. 1981) (passenger 
without standing to object to illegal stop of vehicle), the 
better view is that a passenger has standing to challenge a stop 
-7 
and to claim that evidence seized from the vehicle is 
inadmissible as fruit of the illegal stop. See, e.g., State v. 
Eis, 348 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1984) (both passenger and driver had 
standing to challenge stop of vehicle, for when "the vehicle is 
stopped they are equally seized; their freedom of movement is 
equally affected"); State v. Scott, 59 Or.App. 220, 650 P.2d 985 
(1982) (passenger may claim evidence is fruit of illegal stop). 
See generally 4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.3(e) at 324-25 
(1987 & Supp. 1990). Although defendant had no valid property or 
possessory interest in the vehicle in which he was riding, he 
would nevertheless have standing to challenge the evidence seized 
pursuant to a search of the vehicle on the ground that it was 
fruit of an allegedly illegal stop of the vehicle. Because 
defendant alleges, inter alia, that the evidence should have been 
suppressed because the stop of the vehicle and the subsequent 
arrests of its occupants were unconstitutionally pretextual, the 
State will assume for purposes of argument that defendant has 
standing to challenge the evidence seized from the vehicle in 
3 
which he was a passenger. 
The trial court ruled that defendant did not have standing to 
challenge the search of Ms. Salazar's car, in which he had no 
valid property or possessory int€*rest (SH. 37-38). This is not 
inconsistent with the position taken by the State on appeal. 
Having determined that the stop cind the arrests of defendant and 
his companions were legal, the trial court correctly concluded 
that defendant did not have standing to challenge the search of 
the car and the seizure of evidence of the burglary. In the 
absence of an illegal stop or arrest, defendant would not have a 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" challenge to the evidence seized 
from Ms. Salazar's car, and he would not otherwise have standing 
to challenge that evidence for the reasons discussed in DeAlo. 
The State has decided not to address defendant's arguments 
regarding an illegal stop and arrest, since it believes a far 
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Having said this about the standing question, the 
clearest ground for affirming the trial court's suppression 
ruling is that, even assuming the stop and arrest of defendant 
were pretextual and therefore illegal, defendant was not in a 
position to challenge the evidence subsequently seized from the 
car, because that evidence was obtained pursuant to a search 
voluntarily consented to by the car's owner, Ms. Salazar. That 
consent constituted an intervening event that purged the taint of 
any prior illegality associated with the stop and arrest of 
defendant. See State v. Ribera# 597 P.2d 1164, 1169-70 (Mont. 
1979) (owner's voluntary consent to search of vehicle constituted 
an intervening event sufficient to attenuate the taint of the 
defendant's illegal arrest); State v. Guzy, 134 Wis.2d 399, 397 
N.W.2d 144, 151-52 (Wis. App. 1986) (adopting the legal theory 
set forth in Ribera but remanding for more detailed findings on 
the owner's consent to the search of his vehicle), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 407 N.W.2d 548 (Wis.), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 979 
(1987); Josephs v. Commonwealth, 390 S.E.2d 491, 501-02 (Va. 
App. 1990) (Barrow, J., dissenting) (recognizing that driver's 
valid consent to search of car could be intervening cause or 
event that attenuated taint of illegal stop of vehicle in which 
the defendant was a passenger). 
Cont. simpler resolution to the issue of the admissibility of 
the challenged evidence is found in Ms. Salazar's intervening 
consent to the search of her car. However, if this Court agrees 
with the trial court's conclusions that neither the stop nor the 
arrest was unconstitutionally pretextual, defendant clearly does 
not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle or the 
seizure of the evidence found in it. 
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The trial court found that Ms. Salazar had voluntarily 
consented to the search of her vehicle (SH. 38-39). In its 
ruling the court specifically referred to the following exchange 
during Ms. Salazar's taped telephone conversation with the deputy 
who had impounded her car in which she sought to recover the car: 
Officer: Well, we need to look through your 
car before we let it go. Is that all right 
with you? 
Salazar: Well, will I have to be there? 
Officer: You don't have to. No, you don't 
have to be there. There's been a list done 
on the car. Nothing is going to be missing 
or anything. We just need to look through 
it. But we want to make sure that's all 
right with you. 
Salazar: Yeah. Yeah. I guess so. 
(SH. 38). At trial, Ms. Salazar specifically testified that the 
officer had not put any a pressure on her or applied any threats 
in obtaining her consent to the search of her car (T. 174). 
Defendant argues that the court erroneously found that 
Ms. Salazar had voluntarily consented. To determine whether 
consent to search is voluntary, a totality of circumstances test 
applies to ascertain whether the consent was in fact voluntarily 
given and not the result of "duress or coercion, express or 
implied." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 
(1973). The issue of whether a defendant voluntarily consented 
is a question of fact on which the state carries the burden of 
proof• United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980); 
-10-
Scneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 227.4 Under these standards, the 
trial court's finding that Ms. Salazar's consent was voluntarily 
given was not clearly erroneous. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, granted, P.2d (Utah 
1990). Furthermore, there is nothing in the record that even 
suggests Ms. Salazar's consent was obtained through police 
exploitation of the allegedly illegal stop and arrest of 
defendant. See State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15-17 
(Utah June 28, 1990). 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that Ms. 
Salazar's voluntary consent to the search of her car rendered the 
evidence of the burglary found therein admissible against 
defendant. 
4 
While this Court has made clear that the state has the burden 
of demonstrating voluntary consent, it has not clearly specified 
what standard of proof applies to the burden. In State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Court appears to 
have adopted a clear and convincing standard of proof for this 
inquiry. However, in light of the United States Supreme Court's 
decisions in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (preponderance 
of evidence standard applicable to determination of voluntariness 
of confession), and United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177-
78 n.14 (1974) ("controlling burden of proof at suppression 
hearings should impose no greater burden than proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence"), the preponderance of the 
evidence standard appears to be appropriate. See also Bourjaily 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987) (citing Matlock for 
the principle that "voluntariness of consent to search must be 
shown by preponderance of the evidence"); 4 LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, § 11.2(c) (1987) (noting split in courts on question). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should 
affirm defendant's conviction. ^ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this<^r day of August, 
1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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